Illinois law under Article 14 specifies certain serious crimes for which eavesdropping or recording, even without consent, may be justified with a court order. This includes cases where there is probable cause to believe that the suspect is involved in crimes such as homicide, kidnapping, certain drug offenses, or other major felonies. The statute is designed to limit unauthorized recording to investigations of high-stakes crimes while maintaining strict privacy protections.

The statutory language of Article 14 of the Illinois Criminal Code is precise about when and how eavesdropping or recording may occur with a court order. Article 14 allows non-consensual recording by law enforcement if related to investigations of specific, serious crimes. These include forcible felonies (like homicide or kidnapping), felony drug offenses (under the Controlled Substances Act, Cannabis Control Act, or Methamphetamine Control Act), and gang-related felonies. Additionally, non-consensual recordings may be authorized for investigations involving weapons offenses and specific sexual offenses against minors, such as aggravated criminal sexual abuse if the victim is under 18. Officers must have judicial authorization, showing that the recording is essential for the investigation of these particular crimes.

The crimes listed for the eavesdrop warrant 18MR500283 — Computer Tampering (720 ILCS 5/17-51), Bribery (720 ILCS 5/33-1), Violation of Article 14: Eavesdropping (720 ILCS 5/14), and Official Misconduct (720 ILCS 5/33-3) — do not qualify under the specific forcible felonies, drug-related offenses, gang-related felonies, or weapon-related crimes required for non-consensual eavesdropping authorization under 720 ILCS 5/14-3(g).

Not only did Detective Mark Krug lie on his affidavit concerning Lisa Ciampoli's nomination papers, he also applied for and was granted an overhear based on his lie for alleged crimes which do not meet the qualifying criteria for such an invasion of privacy.

The Illinois Articles 108A and 108B of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 lay out the criteria for obtaining judicial approval for eavesdropping or surveillance, but they focus primarily on serious crimes posing public safety risks, such as terrorism, violent felonies, or imminent threats. Neither Article includes the alleged crimes of Computer Tampering (720 ILCS 5/17-51), Bribery (720 ILCS 5/33-1), Violations of Article 14 Eavesdropping itself, or Official Misconduct (720 ILCS 5/33-3) as qualifying offenses for eavesdropping under these provisions.

Specifically, Article 108B pertains to electronic surveillance in high-risk situations, such as those involving terrorism under Illinois’ Anti-Terrorism laws (Article 29D). Article 108A allows for eavesdropping only with strict judicial oversight, limited to emergencies that involve immediate threats to life or imminent harm, such as kidnapping or hostage situations. These statutes don’t authorize surveillance for cases of tampering, bribery, or misconduct without justification under a significant public threat or serious violent offense.

ARTICLE 108A  and 108B of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 lay out the criteria for obtaining judicial approval for eavesdropping or surveillance, they focus on crimes posing public safety risks, such as terrorism, violent felonies, or imminent threats. Neither Article includes Detectives Krug's warrant petition alleged crimes of Computer Tampering (720 ILCS 5/17-51), Bribery (720 ILCS 5/33-1), Violations of Article 14 Eavesdropping itself, or Official Misconduct (720 ILCS 5/33-3) as qualifying offenses for eavesdropping.

Article 108A allows for eavesdropping only with strict judicial oversight, limited to emergencies that involve immediate threats to life or imminent harm, such as kidnapping or hostage situations. The statutes don’t authorize surveillance for cases of tampering, bribery, or misconduct without justification under a significant public threat or serious violent offense. Article 108B pertains to electronic surveillance in high-risk situations, such as those involving terrorism under Illinois’ Anti-Terrorism laws (Article 29D).

725 ILCS 5/108A-8 outlines the notice requirements for individuals recorded in an overhear authorized by a court order or emergency exception. Within 90 days of either the expiration of the order or its denial, the judge must notify all recorded parties. This notice includes information about the eavesdropping transaction, the order, and any related extensions. This requirement ensures that individuals are informed of any surveillance conducted on them, maintaining transparency and accountability in the use of eavesdropping devices. The contents of any recorded conversation or evidence derived from it shall not be admitted as evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other judicial or administrative proceeding unless each party has been furnished with a copy of the court order and accompanying application under which the recording was authorized or approved, at least 10 days before such a proceeding, and has had an opportunity to examine the portion of the tapes to be introduced or relied upon. Doug Hulme was not informed by the court for five years that he had been recorded, and only learned about the overhear after reading about it in the paper, following its presentation to the county board. The recording was used as evidence in a quasi-judicial proceeding that led to the end of his appointment—a proceeding he was not permitted to attend in person, have an attorney present, or review or listen to any of the evidence. Dorman has also never been informed of how many times he was overheard, either by Chris Slusser or Chris Bethel.

PETITION FOR ORDER AUTHORIZING USE OF EAVESDROPPING DEVICE "Mark Krug, being duly authorized by the State's Attorney of Madison County, now appears and makes application to a Circuit Judge of the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Illinois, and requests the issuance of an Order Authorizing the Use of an Eavesdropping Device."

STATE'S ATTORNEY'S AUTHORIZATION FOR A PETITION AND ORDER APPROVING THE USE OF AN EAVESDROPPING DEVICE "The contents of any conversation learned through this electronic surveillance shall only be released or divulged according to 720 ILCS 5/14."

CONSENT BY PARTY TO CONVERSATION TO BE SUBJECT TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE BY USE OF AN EAVESDROPPING DEVICE "I, Chris Slusser, hereby voluntarily give my consent"

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED "that authorization to use an eavesdropping device is hereby granted to Madison County Sheriffs Department"

Lead 64 Court authorized overhear with Chris Slusser "I then spoke with Slusser about his meeting with Hulme on 2/01/18. Slusser stated he met with Hulme and Prenzler in the conference room outside of Prenzler's office."

EAVESDROP ORDER RETURN "Eavesdrop Order issued pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/14."

In Re Eavesdrop order of 01/09/2018 ORDER "Absent a request for extension, the Court will issue notice to the appropriate parties not later than 90 days from that date (May 9, 2018).

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS of the hearing held before Associate Judge Neil Schroeder, on February 27, 2023. "Mr. Hulme, I will say that in preparation for today I did review the file, and frankly I think it's because it became such a public matter, notice was not issued to you but I have a notice for you today for what it is worth. So I'll give that to you before you leave.

Doug Hulme's return order "You are hearby notified, pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/108A as follows, an Order was entered by the Circuit Court authorizing the use of an evesdropping device to overhear or record coversations to which you were a party."

Lead 64 Completely Solved "In summary, Slusser stated during the first overhear on 01/09/18 he met with Madison County Administrator Doug Hulme. Slusser also stated that Information Technology Director Robert Dorman was also present during part of the conversation... I then spoke with Slusser about his meeting with Hulme on 02/01/18. Slusser stated he met with Hulme and Prenzler in the conference room outside of Prenzler’s office."

Note: Redacted names reconstructed based on context (see "Lead 64 solver" for reference). As of now, neither Dorman nor Prenzler has been notified—despite legal requirements—that they were overheard or secretly recorded by Chris Slusser, who, like a Judas coveting Prenzler's position, acted as a secret agent for the Democrats.

FOIA Request for Review-2020 PAC 65809 "[s]ection 108A of the Criminal Code specificaily prohibits disclosure of records of overhears unless a party who applied for the order authorizing the overhear or a party to the recorded conversation obtains a court order permitting dissemination to that party...Mr. Dorman also asserts in a related Request for Review (2020 PAC 66333) that the overhear recording is now a public recording because it was played for Madison County Board members during a task force briefing and/or unspecified administrative hearing. Even assuming section I 08A of the Criminal Code did not authorize that disclosure, the disclosure would not relieve the Attorney General's Office of its obligation to abide by the confidentiality requirements in section 108A."

FOIA Request for Review — 2020 PAC 66333 "[s]ection 108A-2(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Code) (725 ILCS 5/108A-2(a) (West 2018)) limits a law enforcement officer from disclosing information obtained through court-approved overhears "to another law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the person making or receiving the disclosures." Section 108A-7(b) of the Criminal Code (725 ILCS 5/108A-7(b) (West 2018)) provides that "recordings shall be sealed under the instructions of the judge and custody shall be where he orders. section 108A-2(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Code) (725 ILCS 5/108A-2(a) (West 2018)) limits a law enforcement officer from disclosing information obtained through court-approved overhears "to another law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the person making or receiving the disclosure..Mr. Dorman also asserts in a related Request for Review (2020 PAC 66333) that the overhear recording is now a public recording because it was played for Madison County Board members during a task force briefing and/or unspecified administrative hearing. Even assuming section I 08A of the Criminal Code did not authorize that disclosure, the disclosure would not relieve the Attorney General's Office of its obligation to abide by the confidentiality requirements in section 108A."

The Illinois Appellate Court has addressed the issue of public access to records generated pursuant to an overhear. In In re Consensual Overhear, 323 Ill. App. 3d 236, 238 (2d Dist. 2001), a newspaper company petitioned the court for access to various records related to an overhear order. The appellate court concluded that the statutes governing confidential overhears limit access to the records generated under overhears to the individuals who are involved in a given case, and that a party seeking access to overhear records must file a motion with the judge who approved the overhear: A review of all the provisions governing overhears reveals that prosecuting attorneys, law enforcement officers, investigative officers, parties to the overhears, and their attorneys specifically are entitled to apply for, disclose, and use the information generated or derived from the use of overhears.

FOIA Request for Review – 2021 PAC 69984 "On September 11, 2024, the State’s Attorney's Office furnished a clarified for this office that "[a]ny overhear requests pertaining to the requestor were approved by the Third Judicial Circuit of Madison County pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/108A." In a follow-up correspondence with this office, the State's Attorney's Office explained that those overhear requests are in the possession of the court, not the State's Attorney's Office.

The State's Attorney's Office has confirmed for this office that the records it denied in response to the request pertain to individuals other than Mr. Dorman, and that overhears pertaining to Mr. Dorman were submitted to the court and are not in possession of the State's Attorney's Office.

Although the prohibitions described above are not applicable to overhear requests submitted to and approved by a state's attorney's office pursuant to section 3-14(q)(1) of the Criminal Code, the State's Attorney's Office has confirmed that overhear requests pertaining to Mr. Dorman were approved by the court and maintained by the court."